Carlo's Think Pieces

Reflections of a Filipino in the Netherlands

After a Trump Defeat

Posted by butalidnl on 3 November 2016

The US elections are still some days away; and any side can still win. However, the odds that Hillary Clinton will win the elections are quite good. Trump will lose. Let us take a look at how the how the loss will be for Trump.

Accepting the Results
Inspite of all the furor about whether or not Trump will accept the results of the elections, I believe that he will accept the results of the elections as soon as they are declared. Cinton’s victory will be by a large enough margin that there could be no objection to the result. Trump will probably avoid saying that the elections were rigged, because this may cause violence, and he will be blamed for it. He will resort to blaming his loss on the media and to Republican ‘traitors’.
Incidents of angry Trump supporters being violent will be isolated and short-lived.

Things will have Changed
Trump will not be able to go back to the way things were before his presidential bid.
The accusations of sexual assault by a number of women will keep him busy for a long while. He will probably not sue them, because it would be difficult for him to prove them wrong, and things will turn out worse for him if he sued and lost. After the elections, I expect more women to step up and accuse him of misbehavior.

The campaign has broken the aura of invincibility and impunity around Trump. Media is no longer scared of exposing him in various ways, and people are now more open to revealing his bad business practices (e.g. the case of Trump University).

His businesses will suffer from his presidential bid. His brand is now ‘damaged goods’ for a very big part of the population. Many of his former customers will no longer consider it classy to go to a Trump resort or to buy Trump branded products. His current supporters are not the kind of people who patronized his luxurious brand.
The Trump brand has suffered immensely in Latin America and the Muslim world.

Trump’s unethical business practices will be subject to increased media scrutiny. As a result, Trump will have to stop his practice of employing illegal immigrants, using dubious tax avoidance strategies, etc.. This will significantly increase his cost of doing business. If the Democrats win the House of Representatives, the loopholes that Trump used to avoid paying income tax will be closed.

Trump’s political clout (i.e. his ability to influence politicians) will not be the same as before. Previously, he would contribute to a wide range of politicians, and then collect favors as he needed. Now, only those who are politically aligned to him will ask for his support and potentially do him favors.

Trump TV
What Trump has gained is his popularity among a segment of working-class whites. Many of them will continue to be devoted fans after the elections. There are indications that Trump is preparing to launch Trump TV, which will cater to his new-found base of support. If he did so, it will have to position itself to the right of Fox News.
I believe that the space to the right of Fox News is too small. What will the difference be between Fox News and Trump TV in programing, in news content? If Trump’s outlandish statements would be the main difference, they will not be enough to sustain its audience for long.
It would make good business sense for him not to launch ‘Trump TV’, since it is poised to be a big failure.

Chaos Among Republicans
The elections will probably result in a Democrat majority in the Senate, and a reduced Republican majority in the House of Representtives.  This means that Clinton will be able to appoint progressive Supreme Court judges; but will have to court moderate Republicans to get her legislative proposals through the House of Representatives. She would need only a few Republican congressmen to break any boycott by the Tea Party and Trump’s hard=line followers in Congress. In the previous Congress, the Republicans had boycotted everything that President Obama proposed.

Republicans who supported Trump will blame those who didn’t for the defeat. This internal struggle will push the more moderate Republicans to cooperate more with the Democrats in passing legislation.

The Republicans  will have to reevaluate their opposition to the Affordable Care Act (a.k.a. Obamacare) and gay marriage. If they continue to oppose these, they stand to lose even more ground in subsequent elections.

Trump will retain his wealth after the elections are over; but he will lose a lot of prestige, and have a lower capacity to make money. He will continue to make political statements that may cause some commotion from time to time.

It is even likely that Trump will make another try for the presidency in 2020, especially if Clinton runs for reelection. If he does, the Republicans will be able to stop him early in the primaries.

 

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UK Options in Brexit Negotiations

Posted by butalidnl on 13 August 2016

In the 23 June 2016 referendum, the people of the United Kingdom (UK) voted for their country to leave the European Union (EU). The UK’s new Prime Minister Theresa May has affirmed her government’s commitment to implement the people’s will. ‘Brexit is Brexit’ she said. She still has not officially started the process of the UK leaving the EU, however. This will only happen when she would formally inform the European Council of the UK’s intention to leave. This will activate Article 50 of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty; which provides for two years of talks to arrange the separation.

Before activating Article 50, PM May wants the UK to first determine exactly what it means by ‘Brexit’. What exactly will it bargain for? Her government is expected to come up with an answer before the end of the year, so that the UK could start the process of leaving the EU.
The UK generally has a choice between two main options.

The general positions of both sides are known. The UK wants to retain (most of its) access to the EU Single Market while getting the right to regulate EU migration to the UK. The EU has said that access to the Single Market is a package deal (i.e. there can be no Single Market a la Carte), and thus there can be no exception made for the free movement of labor.
At first glance, one may  think that these are mere starting positions for negotiations, and that some kind of compromise somewhere in between should be possible.  But the EU has a much stronger position than the UK’s, so it is much more likely that the UK will have to work within the framework set by the EU, not the other way around.

Lesson from the Greek Crisis
During the recent Greek crisis, Greek Prime Minister Tsipras assumed that the Eurogroup (the group of countries which have the Euro as their common currency) ,and the EU as a whole, could not afford to let Greece leave the Eurozone. This was based on his assumption that a Greek exit of the Eurozone (or a ‘Grexit’) will unleash a chain reaction that will put the whole Eurozone in crisis. The Greeks thus delayed agreement on a rescue package until the absolute last minute, in the belief that the EU will end up giving them the money they needed without extracting reform and austerity concessions from them.

During marathon talks on 12 – 13 July 2015, PM Tsipras. was shocked to realize that a Grexit was not that much of a worry to the EU. In fact, there were a number of countries (especially Malta and Slovakia) who wanted to throw Greece out of the Eurozone; and that other countries were open to the idea. Bailing out Greece was becoming too much of a burden for them. Also, public opinion throughout the Eurozone had turned against the Greeks, with a growing majority of people actually preferring Grexit.

Tsipras realized then that accepting the Eurogroup proposal was not the worst possible scenario. Getting expelled from the Eurogroup (and maybe the EU), and economic chaos, were much worse. Thus, he ended up  accepting most of the Eurogroup’s package.

The mistake the Greeks made was to assume that they had a stronger negotiating position than the EU; and that the EU would act as they wanted. Many of the UK’s ‘Leave’ campaigners make a similar mistake.

UK Position is Weak
The ‘Leave’ campaigners said that the UK has the stronger position when it comes to trade talks because it is a big trading partner of the EU. They even said that the EU needs a good deal more than the UK does.

They correctly point out tha the EU exports more to the UK than it imports from it (44% of UK exports are to the EU, while 53% .of its imports are from the EU). What they don’t fully realize is that the EU economy is about 9 times bigger than the UK’s; and that from the EU’s point of view, trade with the UK is only a small part of its overall trade (exports to the UK make up 6% to 7% of EU exports, and only 4% to 5% of its imports). If trade talks were to fail, it would be catastrophic for the UK, but merely an inconvenience for the EU.

The negotiations will  be done by 27 different EU countries, and this further weakens the UK’s position. All countries will have issues with certain parts of the deal, which all need to be addressed. Then, the fact that 11% of all UK imports is from Germany (bigger that its imports from the US, and a full fifth of its total imports from the EU), actually makes things worse for the UK; since it is only Germany which would be a bit worried if the UK bought less its products – only one country out of 27.

Once negotiations start, the parties have two years to come to an agreement. If there is no deal, the EU will just treat the UK like any other country.. This will be quite bad for the UK economy. So, it will be the UK that will be under pressure to make an agreement within two years.

Single Market Access
UK politicians keep talking about negotiating for ‘access to the Single Market’, That seems to be clear enough; but actually, it is not. There is a difference between being part of the Single Market and simply having access to it.  In principle, all countries in the world have access to the EU Single Market – in the sense that they can all trade with the EU, invest in companies within the EU, and have their citizens travel to the EU. Being part of the Single Market, however, entails a deeper involvement in it. It gives the EU countries advantages that non-members do not enjoy. These include the following:
1. Goods that cross internal EU borders will not be subject to tariffs, nor to administrative, technical or other non-tariff barriers. In effect, they will be treated in the same way as locally produced goods  .
2. Their companies could operate all throughout the EU, and be treated the same as local companies.
3. Their companies could hire personnel from all over the EU.
4. The EU negotiates trade agreements with other countries on behalf of all its members.
5. Their companies could bid for government contracts in all EU countries. Big companies, big non-profits and government institutions are required to be open to bids from  companies all over the EU.
6. Licenses to operate that are granted in any member country are valid all over the EU.
7. Diplomas and school credits from any member country are valid throughout the EU.
8. All EU citizens are able to participate in, and benefit from, social security, health and other programs that are open to host country citizens. EU students pay the same school fees as local students.

As part of the Single Market, the UK has become a base for many foreign companies that serve the EU market. This has made London a financial center and a center for internet technology. The UK is the manufacturing base for many foreign auto makers. UK-based service companies have a significant part of the EU market. The UK people and companies have benefitted greatly from being part of the EU Single Market.
This is why the UK wants to retain many of the advantages from being in the Single Market, while taking control of migration into the UK.

The Single Market, however, is an integral whole. It will be extremely difficult for the EU to agree to the UK’s desire to leave out the free movement of labor.  The poorer countries of the EU will not agree to this, especially since they don’t gain much from trade with the UK anyway.

A basic aspect of the Single Market is the body of laws that govern it. UK voters were told that Brexit meant that they would not follow EU laws anymore. But it is impossible to be part of the Single Market without following the laws that govern it.

Another important aspect of the Single Market is the financial contribution to maintaining it. EU countries will not agree to give the UK a free ride. If we take what Norway pays (which participates in the Single Market, but is not an EU member) as an indication, the UK would pay about 6 billion euros a year as administration cost for being part of the  Single Market. This is less than the present net UK contribution to the EUof 14 billion euros a year, but it is still something that many Brexit voters will not like.

If the UK wants to be part of the Single Market, it must:
– accept all the laws that govern the Single Market (including the free movement of labor);
– contribute financially to administering the Single Market.
These conditions would likely be politically unacceptable in the UK; so, it will not be possible for the country to remain within the Single Market. This leaves the UK with two main options.

Free Trade Plus
The more likely option is for the UK to negotiate a ‘Free Trade Agreement Plus’.

A Free Trade Agreement (one which provides for tariff-free trade) between the EU and the UK would be ‘relatively easy’ to make. The problem would be in the details (of course). One such detail would be fishing: if UK fishermen are no longer constrained by EU fishing quotas, other countries may push for a maximum import quota for UK fish, or for the exclusion of UK fishermen from EU waters. There are many such details that need to be hammered out.

The EU and UK could also agree on a transition period during which people and companies who currently enjoy Single Market privileges would continue to avail of them. For example, UK residents already in EU countries could continue to be covered by domestic health care and other social security programs during the transition period. EU citizens in the UK would enjoy similar benefits.

There could be additional agreements made on specific matters, such as:
1. Cross recognition of diplomas and school credits.
2. The free movement of labor for specific sectors (e.g. Internet Technology).
3. Agreements on specific product categories (e.g. for wines and spirits).

European Economic Area
Another option for the UK would be for it to immediately leave the EU with a transition period during which it will remain within the Single Market. This will mean that during this period UK laws will have to continue to be in harmony with the EU’s laws, and that the UK will contribute around 6 billion euros a year to the Single Market administration costs.
This arrangement will be similar to what Norway has with the EU; Norway is a member of the European Economic Area.

This arrangement will give the UK time to negotiate a longer-term deal with the EU, and to have trade talks with other countries. An added advantage of this option is that Scotland will not leave the UK, for as long as the UK stays within the Single Market.

The problem with this is that the Brexit advocates will complain that the UK is effectively not leaving the EU, since immigration will continue as before, and the UK can’t make its own laws on a host of economic issues.

The choice is PM May’s. Will she choose  to immediately negotiate for a Free Trade Agreement Plus; or will she choose the more careful route of temporary EEA status?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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The 2-year Transition to Brexit

Posted by butalidnl on 29 June 2016

On 23 June, the people of the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU).  The UK and the EU will have two years to negotiate the terms of the separation. (The 2-year period will start when the UK officially informs the EU of its intention to leave; this may be sometime in September) During this period, the British will already feel some negative effects of Brexit (British Exit from the EU).
During the 2-year negotiating period, the UK will remain a full member of the EU, with all the privileges and responsibilities this entails.

The coming two years will not be uneventful, however.

Devaluation. In response to the Brexit vote, the British Pound fell from a rate of 1.50 to the dollar, to a low of 1.33 on 24 June. It may still go down a bit farther. Devaluation is supposed to decrease imports (as they become more expensive) and increase exports (as they become cheaper); but this effect takes 9 months to happen. Inflation is sticky upwards (i.e. prices tend to rise fast but fall very slowly if at all), so devaluation would mean that inflation will increase as a result of devaluation.

Immigration. The Brexit vote will probably have the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing immigration – at least during the 2-year period. EU nationals seeking to work and live in the UK may rush in before the UK actually leaves the EU. British pensioners would delay deciding whether to move to Spain and elsewhere in the EU until the rules for this (e.g. for health care insurance, residency permits, etc.) are clear.

Short Term Grants Only.  EU funding for research, study, small business support, urban renewal , and other projects will need to finish before the cut-off date. As a result, fewer and fewer projects will be supported as the deadline comes closer.

Freeze on Foreign Investments. While the new agreement between the UK and EU is being negotiated, foreign companies would be extremely hesitant to invest in the UK. Foreign Direct Investment will dry up.

Transfer of Operations. Businesses will start the process of transferring some of their operations to EU countries as early as during the negotiation period. For those whose EU headquarters are in London, these offices will be downsized into UK offices. For foreign companies which had set up manufacturing plants in the UK to access the EU market, they will simply set up new plants elsewhere in the EU and downsize their UK operations gradually.

Separation. Scotland will most probably hold a referendum on leaving the UK, so that it can remain in the EU. During the Brexit vote, 62% of Scots voted to Remain, and Remain won in all of its counties. The Scots are mad at England for dragging them out of the EU.
Northern Ireland, which also voted for Remain,  is considering the option of leaving the UK and joining the Republic of Ireland. This will be more difficult for them than for Scotland because the Ulster Unionists are vehemently against leaving the UK. However, if Northern Ireland is allowed to hold a referendum on whether it wants to leave the UK, a majority will vote to do so.
If Scotland (and maybe Northern Ireland) leave the UK, this will have negative economic and political effects on the rest of the UK.

Economic Uncertainty. Nobody knows what kind of deal the UK will finally forge with the EU, or what kinds of political changes will take place. This means that the British economy will be saddled by uncertainty for the next two years at least. This is bad  for the economy. Credit rating agencies have lowered the UK’s rating; making it more expensive for the UK government to borrow money.

And finally, there is Regrexit – Regret at the British Exit from the EU. The online petition calling for a second referendum will not get more than a debate in Parliament; it will not delay or overturn the referendum results.
The growing movement against Brexit will  influence the negotiations between the UK and the EU, by pushing to keep the UK inside the Single Market (including immigration of EU nationals). There could be quite heated public debate on this during the negotiations.

All the above are a list of bad things that will happen before the UK leaves the EU. When the UK finally leaves the EU,  things will get even worse.

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Why the UK will vote to Leave the EU

Posted by butalidnl on 7 June 2016

On 23 June, the people of the United Kingdom (UK) will vote on whether their country stays in , or leaves, the European Union (EU). While most polls show that the votes for ‘Leave’ and ‘Stay’ are roughly tied; I think that the ‘Leave’ camp will get the majority of the votes.

I am not saying this because I agree with the ‘Leave’ campaign. In fact, I believe that Brexit will be bad for both the United Kingdom and the European Union. I couldn’t do anything about it, since I can’t vote in the referendum.

Let us look at some of the dynamics that will affect the Brexit (‘Bristish Exit from the EU’) vote.

Old versus Young
The overwhelming majority of the UK’s older citizens are inclined to vote to leave the EU. These people perceive the EU as gradually stripping their country of its sovereignty. At the same time, they do not feel or experience the advantages of increased travel possibilities, friendships throughout Europe, EU subsidies and grants, etc that EU membership brings.

On the other hand, the young generation has grown up with the UK in the EU. They travel, have many personal links in Europe, benefit from study grants or other EU programs, etc. They know that the EU could provide them with future jobs and opportunities.

The votes of these two groups should balance out. However, the older people are much more likely to vote, and are quite motivated to do so. The youth, in contrast, are less likely to vote. This is made worse by the referendum day falling in a time of college exams and the beginning of the summer vacation.

Feeling the Effects
Whichever way the UK votes, most of the effects will not be felt for some time. At least two years, in fact. This is because the UK will have at least two years to negotiate its exit from the European Union. Things will remain generally the same in this period.
One possible immediate effect would be the weakening of the British Pound if ‘Leave’ wins. This may lead to an increase in exports; as well as to more expensive imports.

When the UK finally leaves the EU (perhaps in 2019), the government will most likely restrict immigration. Fewer EU nationals will be allowed to move in and work in the UK; while fewer UK nationals will move in and work in other EU countries. What will be felt by more people is the lower level of immigration. For them, this will mean less congestion when availing of government services, and maybe lead to more jobs for UK nationals.
The decreased chance to live and  work in the EU will be felt by far less people..

On the longer term, Brexit will lead to a gradual transfer of companies to countries within the EU. Foreign companies which had built manufacturing plants or service hubs in the UK in order to serve the EU market will gradually shift operations to countries inside the EU. Big British companies will need to set up their Europe headquarters elsewhere; they may also shift some of their operations to within the EU. London’s role as a global financial center will diminish.

Scotland may decide to leave the UK because of the Brexit vote. There would be less trade, and increased cost of trade. There could be many other, mostly negative, effects.

UK citizens will anticipate the more immediate positive effects of Brexit; while discounting the possibility or the extent of the negative effects.  People are more likely to choose immediate gain over (bigger) future problems.

Managing Images
A big problem of the ‘Stay’ camp is that it does not promise anything – only a continuation of the present. The ‘Leave’ camp, on the other hand, promises a return of their country’s independence, less strain on the job market and social services due to immigration, and even a vision of a more powerful and prosperous country.

Efforts by the ‘Stay’ camp to show that a Brexit will cause an economic disaster have been met with accusations that they do not have confidence in the strength and vitality of their country and people. They then shifted tack to saying that Britain will still prosper outside the EU, but that it will prosper more within it. The result is that many people have gotten the idea that Brexit will not have long-term negative economic consequences.

The issue of sovereignty is a favorite of the ‘Leave’ campaign. They argue that the country has surrendered a big part of its sovereignty to the EU.  This is because the British parliament has had to pass a lot of laws to align with decisions made by the EU. The fact that the UK participates in making those decisions is discounted by saying that it has only one voice out of 28.  They create an image of the UK fighting against 27 others and losing; where in fact it is quite often in agreement with the majority.Also, when decisions are made in the European Parliament or even the European Council, the UK has a very big voice..
The ‘Leave’ campaign’s claim that Brexit will reduce immigration is brilliant. Most people have some (mostly minor) irritation due to recent immigrants (both from the EU, and elsewhere) – be it  longer queues for health services, scarcity of cheap housing, miscommunication with foreigners, etc.  And since cutting immigration is one promise a Brexit vote would most likely deliver; a lot of people will be more inclined to choose ‘Leave’.

The only way the ‘Stay’ campaign can win is if it manages to convince people that Brexit will lead to big economic problems and uncertainty. If enough uncertainty is generated, people will have a natural tendency to choose the status quo. Scare tactics worked to keep Scotland in the UK; it might be the only way to keep the UK in the EU.

 

 

 

 

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On the Offer of Four Cabinet Posts

Posted by butalidnl on 25 May 2016

President-elect Rodrigo Duterte has offered four cabinet posts to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). They are that of : DOLE (Department of Labor and Employment),  DAR (Department of Agrarian Reform), DSWD (Department of Social Work and Development) and DENR (Department of the Environment and Natural Resources). During the election campaign Duterte had promised to make peace with the CPP and bring them into government.

The Departments
Duterte chose four departments which the CPP could offer to the CPP. While these departments are important, they are not essential politicial, economic or security tasks of the government.

DAR. This department fits best with both the interests and the skill set of the CPP. The Philippines has already had two DAR secretaries from the Left: Ernesto Garilao (1992 – 1996) and Horacio Morales (1998 – 2001).  There are already several lower-level DAR officials who used to be leftist activists.

DOLE. The KMU (Kilusang Mayo Uno, May First Movement) and the rest of the progressive labor  movement.may probably be able to provide suitable candidates for labor Secretary. The most left-leaning labor secretary so far was Augusto Sanchex, who was a prominent human rights lawyer before serving as Labor Secretary in 1986 -1987.

DENR. The CPP has a mixed record when it comes to environmental issues. While it sometimes condemns mining companies and loggers for their various violations of environmental laws; the CPP often allows them to operate in their areas as long as they pay ‘revolutionary taxes’. At the same time, the government has a terrible record in appointing Environment Secretaries. Having a CPP nominee in the position may be a welcome change.

DSWD. Corazon Soliman, who served as Welfare Secretary from 2001 to 2005 and again from 2010 to 2016, was a moderate-left activist before becoming Secretary. She has been credited with the successful implementation of the landmark Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Program – which gives a modest subsidy to poor families on the condition that their children attend school and avail of medical services. About 4.4 million people benefit from the CCT Program.

Possible Problems
CPP leader Jose Maria Sison has declared that they would accept the offer, and will come up with names of ‘left’ personalities as nominees for the Secretary positions.

The process of actually coming up with nominees could prove difficult, though. In the past years, the CPP had been busy ejecting people from the party who could qualify for such positions;  condemning them for being ‘reformist’ or something similar. Now, the CPP would have to pick candidates from the few cadres it has left who  would qualify for these positions.
If the CPP cannot source nominees from among its ranks, they may be forced to nominate people from outside its immediate circles – maybe even people whom it had previously condemned as reformist.

An even bigger hurdle to the CPP coming up with nominees the  matter of fitting the appointing of four cabinet secretaries into its overall strategy.  It may be too easy to say  that this  is a matter of temporary tactics. However, it would mean a major adjustment in how the CPP does things. Specifically, it has to do with the role of the armed struggle to achieve its goals. While Duterte has not spelled it out explicitly, he expects a quid pro quo for the cabinet positions – that of having a ceasefire and peace talks. A six-year ceasefire would wreck havoc within the New Peoples Army; if it does not have anything to do, its ranks will fade away.

Then there is the matter of the CPP strategy for finally achieving power. Will the CPP accept a negotiated route to achieving its goals? or would it be just a temporary detour from the armed struggle? And what is the use of armed struggle if they could gain a governmental role simply by a political route? Their rationale for engaging in armed struggle is that the ruling classes would violently oppose efforts to change the political and economic system. Questions of strategy are a point of tension within the CPP. The balance between ‘legal’ struggle and armed struggle, and their relationship, has been a topic of internal debate and even splits for decades. The question of the cabinet positions will surely increase these tensions within the party.

Duterte’s policies could also be a sticking point. Bayan (a CPP-influenced mass organization) has already denounced Duterte’s economic policies. A more problematic issue is Duterte’s plan to have the dictator Ferdinand Marcos buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (Burial Place for Heroes). This would also mean some kind of rehabilitation for him. The CPP may not want to be part of a government that rehabilitates Marcos.

Then comes the problems with security. If the DSWD includes peasants from the CPP mass base in the CCT program, the government will know who they are. After the 6-year period, they may be attacked for being communist sympathizers. Also, having a DAR Secretary may mean that the government military entering CPP-controlled areas to implement DAR orders.And what about the security of the Secretaries themselves and their staffers? They may all need to go underground after Duterte’s term.

Choosing a Response
Sison may have declared acceptance of the four cabinet posts; but this does not necessarily mean that the CPP really accepts the offer. It is the actual leaders of the CPP in the country who really call the shots. Sison was only given authority to hold peace talks with the government; actual concessions would need to be made by the leaders in the Philippines.

The CPP’s Central Committee, or more specifically the Secretariat of its Executive Committee, would be the one to make the final decision. Before doing so, they would need to consult some of the lower party organs e.g. the United Front Commission, which will probably be tasked to produce the nominees,  as well as the New People’s Army’s high command. I suspect the NPA will balk at the prospect of having a 6-year ceasefire.
After careful consideration the Secretariat will issue its decision on this matter.

The decision could be within the following range:
Full acceptance of Duterte’s offer. Four nominees will be chosen from among the ranks of its ‘influenced’ organizations.  Peace talks with the government will be started. A ceasefire of limited duration will be declared, as a possible prelude to an extended ceasefire.
or
The CPP will decline the offer. Disagreement on ssues e.g the proposed burial of Marcos and/or other portions of Duterte’s policies will be deemed incompatible with participation in his government.
or
Something in between.

I suspect that the CPP leadership will neither fully accept nor fully reject Duterte’s offer. Perhaps it could nominate someone for DAR or DOLE from within its ranks,  but nominate outside progressives for DENR and DSWD. It could agree on a partial ceasefire – i.e. that no large-scale military operations will be undertaken, but that ‘police actions’ by both sides would be allowed (this may be done to appease the NPA leadership). Also, the peace talks could be held both in the Philippines and with Sison’s team abroad.

The way the CPP handles this offer could determine its prospects of building peace with the govenment, including for the period after Duterte’s presidency.

 

 

 

 

 

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